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Abstract
Humeʼs Theory of Sympathy as a Principle of Human Nature
   This paper attempts to elucidate the signiﬁcance of Humeʼs theory of 
passion, in particular his accounts of indirect passion and of sympathy. 
First, I set out the theoretical role the theory of passion plays in the whole 
scheme of Humeʼs Treatise. I claim that the theory of indirect passion 
explains how some physical objects become brought within the sphere of 
social valuation. Physical objects and human actions are incorporated into 
social relationships by causing the sentiments of pride or humility, thus 
producing the social perception of the self. The social perception of objects 
leads to the notion of possession, and develops into justice as the system of 
property. Humeʼs theory of indirect passion culminates in the theory of 
sympathy. I indicate that there is a parallelism between Humeʼs theory of 
“abstract ideas” and that of sympathy as the general recognition of the 
particular. Sympathy enables people to act on behalf of others, and thus 
serves as the fundamental principle of social cooperation. In this way, 
Humeʼs theory of passion is a significant departure from social contract 
theory, explaining the natural formation of sociability in a way that is 
logically prior to the formation of political authority.
